Global Financial Risk, Domestic Financial Access, and Unemployment Dynamics by Epstein, Brendan et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Global Financial Risk, Domestic
Financial Access, and Unemployment
Dynamics
Brendan Epstein and Alan Finkelstein Shapiro and Andres
Gonzalez Gomez




MPRA Paper No. 88692, posted 31 August 2018 22:58 UTC
Global Financial Risk, Domestic Financial
Access, and Unemployment Dynamics∗
Brendan Epstein† Alan Finkelstein Shapiro‡ Andre´s Gonza´lez Go´mez§
August 8, 2017
Abstract
We empirically show that after an increase in global financial risk,
the response of unemployment is markedly more subdued in emerging
economies (EMEs) relative to small open advanced economies (SOAEs),
while the differential response of GDP and investment across the two
country groups is noticeably smaller, if at all, in EMEs. A model with
banking frictions, frictional unemployment, and household and firm het-
erogeneity in financial inclusion can help rationalize these facts. Limited
financial inclusion among households is central to explaining the differ-
ential response of unemployment in EMEs amid global financial risk
shocks.
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1 Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 represents a clear example of how
U.S. financial disruptions can have dramatic effects on employment and eco-
nomic activity, and also propagate to emerging economies (EMEs) and ad-
vanced economies. Given the prominent role of the U.S. in global financial
markets, such disruptions are effectively exogenous increases in global finan-
cial risk from the vantage point of EMEs and small open advanced economies
(SOAEs). Recent studies have stressed the international transmission of U.S.
financial risk shocks to these country groups via credit markets and the bank-
ing system. However, much less is known about the factors that shape the
degree of domestic propagation of these foreign shocks and, importantly, their
consequences for domestic labor markets in EMEs and SOAEs. As we doc-
ument in this paper, such issues are non-trivial since these country groups
exhibit striking differences in the rates of firm and household financial inclu-
sion and participation in the domestic banking system, with SOAEs having
considerably higher rates relative to EMEs.
Motivated by these facts, this paper provides new VAR-based evidence sug-
gesting that, in response to an increase in global financial risk—defined as a
rise in U.S. firm credit spreads, which embody U.S. (or global) financial risk—
the response of unemployment is markedly and unambiguously more subdued
in emerging economies (EMEs) relative to small open advanced economies
(SOAEs). In contrast, the differential response of GDP and investment across
the two country groups is noticeably smaller, with aggregate economic activity
exhibiting, on average, marginally earlier recoveries, if at all, in EMEs. To
rationalize these new empirical facts we build a small open economy (SOE)
model with labor search frictions, a frictional banking structure, and hetero-
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geneity in firm and household participation in the banking system at its core.
Our framework features two household and firm categories. First, financially-
included households that participate in the banking system by holding bank de-
posits and financially-included firms that rely on bank credit to finance capital
purchases. Second, financially-excluded households that do not hold deposits
and therefore do not participate in the banking system and household firms
that do not (or cannot) borrow from banks and therefore do not participate in
the banking system.1 Banks use deposits from financially-included households,
foreign funds, and their own net worth to lend to financially-included firms.
Following the literature on banking frictions, banks face frictions in raising ex-
ternal funds (deposits and foreign resources) as a result of agency problems. A
temporary adverse global financial shock disrupts banks’ ability to raise these
funds, leading to a contraction in the supply of available loans for capital pur-
chases, and in turn to reductions in aggregate employment, investment, and
output.
To shed light on the differential response of EMEs and SOAEs to global
financial risk in the data, and guided by cross-country evidence on domestic
financial participation, we consider two versions of our model that differ pri-
marily in the degree of firm and household financial participation in order to
arrive at ”representative” characterizations of EMEs and SOAEs.
Our quantitative analysis shows that the contribution of firms with bank
credit to total output (a broad measure of firm financial inclusion in the
model), of which SOAEs tend to have a larger share compared to EMEs,
1Given that our interest is in the employment and aggregate consequences of limited
financial participation by households and firms and not in explaining why certain firms or
individuals do not or cannot participate in the banking system, we abstract from modeling
the underlying frictions (informational, contractual, etc.) at the root of the limited depth of
firms’ and households’ financial inclusion in EMEs relative to SOAEs and simply take this
depth differential as given.
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shapes the extent of the contraction and recovery in investment and output
after an increase in global financial risk. This result is intuitive: the larger is
the contribution of firms that rely on bank credit to total output, the larger
the share of the economy that is vulnerable to changes in global financial risk.
Surprisingly, by itself, the contribution of firms using bank credit to total out-
put plays plays virtually no role in explaining the markedly more subdued and
less persistent empirical response of unemployment in EMEs after an increase
in global financial risk. Instead, it is the share of financially-excluded indi-
viduals in the economy—and the implied allocation of employment across the
two firm categories—that is central to explaining the empirical difference in
the response of unemployment to an increase in global financial risk in EMEs
relative to SOAEs. We stress that the allocation of employment across firm
categories is endogenous in our model and a direct reflection of the level of
financial inclusion among households. Intuitively, the larger the share of indi-
viduals in households without access to bank deposits, the smaller the amount
of available resources for firms with bank credit. As such, the larger the
endogenously-determined share of employment in firms without access to bank
credit, the larger the share of employment that is (partially) shielded from
an increase in global financial risk, and therefore the smaller the increase in
unemployment after an adverse financial shock. Of note, empirical evidence
on the share of employment in firms that tend to lack access to bank credit
in EMEs and SOAEs broadly supports the allocation of employment that is
endogenously generated by our model-based prototypical EMEs and SOAEs.
Importantly, by using a richer version of our baseline model where households
can search for employment across firm categories, we stress and explicitly show
that the differential response of unemployment generated by the model, which
is consistent with our new VAR evidence, does not hinge on segmented labor
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markets.
Our findings suggest that, conditional on shocks to global financial risk and
when compared to SOAEs, EMEs are on average less responsive to such shocks
because of their firms’ and households’ lower levels of domestic participation in
the banking system. Of course, we stress that our findings do not imply that
EMEs are less volatile than SOAEs; other shocks and economic characteris-
tics that we abstract from (trend, terms-of-trade, uncertainty, and domestic
financial shocks and distortions; international trade disturbances, etc.) can be
responsible for the well-known higher variability of aggregate economic activ-
ity in EMEs. At the same time, our results do not imply that interest rate
shocks are any less relevant for short-run economic activity or unemployment
in EMEs. Indeed, an important literature supports the relevance of these (and
other) shocks for EME business cycles. The subtle but important difference
between our work and existing studies stems from the fact that our work ex-
plicitly compares the response of EMEs to SOAEs, whereas most of the EME
literature has generally focused on the effects of these and other shocks only
in EMEs. We also stress that our goal is not to explain the underlying reason
behind differences in financial inclusion among firms and households. Instead,
we focus on the consequences of these differences for the economy’s response
to changes in global financial risk.
The importance of interest rates, financial frictions, and financial shocks
for aggregate fluctuations in EMEs is well known (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005,
Uribe and Yue, 2006; Mendoza, 2010, Akinci, 2013; Ferna´ndez and Gulan,
2015; Fink and Schu¨ler, 2015). Our work is closest to the growing literature
on financial frictions (Jermann and Quadrini, 2012; Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek,
2012), and specifically in the banking sector (see Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010;
Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto, 2012; Dedola,
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Karadi, and Lombardo, 2013, for advnaced economies; and Akinci and Quer-
alto, 2014; Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki, 2016; Cuadra and Nuguer, 2015;
Nuguer, 2015; Große Steffen, 2015; among others, for EMEs).2 The banking
frictions in our framework are similar to those in Aoki, Benigno, and Kiy-
otaki (2016), who consider EMEs where banks use both domestic deposits
and foreign funds to finance lending activities. Of note, none of these papers
consider unemployment dynamics, or how EMEs and SOAEs may be affected
differentially by financial disruptions.3 Finally, recent work has studied global
business cycles and the propagation mechanisms that might explain them (see,
for example, Kose et al., 2012). Our work is related to the latter literature only
insofar as we consider global financial risk shocks as a source of fluctuations in
small open (advanced and emerging) economies. However, our interest is not
in explaining global business cycles but in exploring how small open economies’
degree of domestic financial access shapes these economies labor market and
aggregate response to changes in global financial conditions.
Our main contributions to the literature are: documenting a new and ro-
bust empirical fact on the differential response of economic activity and more
importantly unemployment to global financial risk shocks in EMEs vis-a`-vis
SOAEs and not in EMEs exclusively ; exploring the effects of global financial
2See Monacelli, Quadrini, and Trigari (2012); Buera, Fattal Jaef, and Shin (2015); Ep-
stein, Finkelstein Shapiro, and Gonza´lez Go´mez (2017) for work on the interaction between
financial shocks and employment dynamics. The studies on banking frictions above consider
the propagation of financial shocks within or across economies through the banking system.
A related literature has explored the propagation of shocks via trade flows (see, for example,
Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan, 2013). Given our specific focus on financial conditions,
we abstract from considering trade flows in our work. However, we control or such flows in
our empirical analysis.
3Ferna´ndez and Meza (2015) characterize the role of informal employment for EME
business cycles. Papers that address unemployment dynamics with a focus on EMEs include
Boz, Durdu, and Li (2015), Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro (2017), and Finkelstein Shapiro
and Gonza´lez Go´mez (2017), among others. None of these studies address the heterogeneity
in financial inclusion on the households side, which we show to be critical.
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shocks in a model that merges frictions in the banking system with firm and
household heterogeneity and equilibrium unemployment, where the latter is of
key interest in light of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009; and stressing
the importance of differences in not only firm but also household domestic
financial participation between EMEs and SOAEs for understanding the labor
market and aggregate responses to financial shocks.4
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the main
facts that motivate our modeling approach and describes the new VAR-based
evidence on global financial risk shocks. Section 3 presents the model. Section
4 describes our quantitative approach and analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
We compare EMEs to SOAEs and abstract from larger advanced economies
for two main reasons. First, while the latter economies are clearly affected by
U.S. financial risk, they are large enough to also influence U.S. financial risk,
implying that the identification of global financial risk shocks is less straight-
forward. Second, SOAEs are naturally more comparable to EMEs relative to
their larger counterparts by being small and open as well.
2.1 Domestic Financial Inclusion and Participation
To arrive at our representative EMEs and SOAEs in the model, Table 1 docu-
ments the wide empirical disparities between EMEs and SOAEs in participa-
4In recent empirical work, Gilchrist and Mojon (2017) document the response of economic
activity, including unemployment, to changes in financial risk in the Euro area. While our
focus on financial risk is similar to theirs, we center on the differences between EMEs and
SOAEs as opposed to a single country group, and focus on differences in domestic financial
inclusion.
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tion in, and access to, financial institutions by households and firms. On the
household side, while the average share of the population with an account at
financial institutions—an indicator of households’ participation in (and access
to) the domestic banking system—is virtually 100 percent in SOAEs, it is only
45 percent in EMEs.5.
Turning to firms, while bank loans represent the primary source of exter-
nal financing for the majority of registered (or formal) firms in both country
groups, only 30 percent of firms in EMEs have access to and use such financing.
In contrast, at least 70 percent of firms in SOAEs use bank loans (Table 2;
Table A1; IFC Enterprise Finance Gap Database; IFC, 2010a,b). Unsurpris-
ingly, then, a larger fraction of firms in EMEs cite credit access as a major con-
straint (Table 1; Beck and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, 2006; Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and
Mart´ınez Per´ıa, 2007; Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008; Ayya-
gari, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Maksimovic, 2012).6 All told, the majority of firms in
EMEs does not have access to bank credit (or any other type of formal credit),
5Similarly, the share of individuals who receive their wages directly into an account at
financial institutions—which offers an alternative picture of financial inclusion that also
provides information on firms’ participation (since firms must participate in the banking
system in order to deposit wages into their workers’ accounts)—is almost 100 percent in
SOAEs versus 51 percent in EMEs. See Table A1 in the Appendix for disaggregated data
by country. Of note, compared to SOAEs, EMEs tend to have lower shares of salaried em-
ployment and higher shares of self-employment (see OECD, 2009). As such, the contrasting
shares of workers that receive their wages in an account at financial institutions makes the
SOAEs’ higher degree of household financial inclusion all the more noteworthy
6According to IFC (2010a,b), close to 50 percent of registered small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs, or firms with less than 250 workers) in EMEs either need loans but do not
have access to credit, or face significant financing constraints. Moreover, registered SMEs
represent only 30 percent of all firms. The remaining 70 percent of SMEs are unregistered—
or informal—and have little to no access to bank financing despite these firms stating a
need for credit. Importantly, SMEs account for the majority of firms in these economies as
well as a significant share of employment. In contrast, Eurostat survey data shows that:
the majority of firms in SOAEs participate in the banking system; the bulk of loan finance
obtained by SOAE firms comes from banks; loan finance represents the most sought-after
source of finance; and more than 90 percent of firms seeking bank finance are successful in
receiving loans (OECD, 2012, 2016; European Central Bank, 2015).
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whereas the opposite is the case in SOAEs. Importantly, we note that only
a minuscule share of firms in EMEs—those publicly-traded and participating
in stock markets—can tap (local and international) equity markets in order
to substitute or complement bank credit, with most firms in EMEs relying on
internal resources or informal external financing (IFC, 2010a,b).
Table 1: Households Financial Inclusion in Advanced versus Emerging Economies
Country Account at Financial Received Wages Ease of Access
Group Institutions into Account in to Loans Index
(% of Population Financial Institution (7 = very easy,
Age 15+) (% Wage 1= impossible)
Recipients, Age 15+)
AEs 97.7 95.9 4.85
EMEs 45.0 50.6 3.42
Source: World Bank Global Financial Inclusion Database 2015, World Economic Forum
(WEF) Financial Development Report 2008. Notes: The SOAE sample includes Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway,
and Sweden. The EME sample includes Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru,
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey. We use the 2011 (2014) survey from the
Global Findex Database for the share of individuals with an account at financial institutions
(the share of recipients of wages receiving their salary directly into an account at a financial
institution; data from 2011 on this variable is generally not available for most economies).
Norway is the only country for which we use data from 2014 for both measures due to data
availability. The measure for ”Ease of Access to Loans” is based on the following question
from the WEF Executive Opinion Survey 2006, 2007: ”How easy is it to obtain a bank loan
in your country with only a good business plan and no collateral?”.
Table 2: Firm Access to Financing in Advanced European Economies and Emerging
Economies
Country Firm Share of Share of Firms Share of Bank as a
Group Category Total with Bank Firms with Source of
Firms Credit Access Bank Loans Financing
(%) (% Firms) (% Firms) (% Firms)
EMEs Formal 32.22 69.78 49.33 85.5
Informal 67.78 13.11 12.44 −
AEs Formal 69.30 − 68 90.2
Informal 30.70 − − −
Sources: IFC Enterprise Finance Gap Database 2010 (for EMEs), Eurostat an Survey of Ac-
cess to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE, 2011) (for advanced European economies, AEs), and
World Bank World Development Indicators (credit spreads). Notes: The list of AEs from
SAFE includes: Austria, Belgium, Finland, and Netherlands. The list of EMEs includes
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, and Turkey
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(there is no data available for Thailand). The data on the fraction of formal and informal
firms for AEs is based on IFC data for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden. The remaining evidence for AEs
is from SAFE 2011 since there is no available comparable data on access to financing for ad-
vanced economies in the IFC Enterprise Finance Gap Database. Thus, this evidence is only
meant to be illustrative of the differences in firms’ access to finance between EMEs and AEs.
Formal firms are comprised of registered micro (1-4 employees), very small (5-9 employees),
small (10-49 employees), and medium (50-250 employees) enterprises. Informal firms are un-
registered with their municipality or the country’s tax authorities, and includes owner-only
firms regardless of registration status. See https://www.smefinanceforum.org/data-sites/ifc-
enterprise-finance-gap for more details. The facts for advanced economies are based on
information reported by all firms included in the survey (gazelles, high-growth enterprises,
and other enterprises). The share of firms with a loan for advanced economies includes firms
with bank loans and/or bank overdrafts. See Table A1 for a decomposition of Table 2 by
country for EMEs.
2.2 Global Financial Risk and Unemployment
Data and Empirical Specification We use data from 2003Q1 to 2015Q4
for a balanced panel of SOAEs and data from 2005Q1 to 2015Q4 for a balanced
panel of EMEs to characterize the response of aggregate economic activity
(real GDP and investment) and unemployment to global financial risk shocks
in the two country groups. The sample starting dates are determined by
(1) the availability of uninterrupted time series for quarterly unemployment
rates across countries (more on this below) and (2) the starting date of our
measure of global financial risk.7 The Appendix presents all details pertaining
to the data sources and specific variable definitions that are not essential for
presenting our stylized fact.
The countries we consider are standard in the literature on EMEs and
7Some EMEs experienced changes in their labor force surveys in the early 2000s, making
the series prior to the change not comparable to the ones based on the new surveys. Mexico
and Brazil are two well-known examples. We also note that both SOAEs and EMEs not only
follow explicit ILO guidelines but also rely on labor force surveys that explicitly consider
both formal and informal employment to measure official unemployment rates. As such,
while informal employment may play a relevant role in unemployment rates in EMEs (see,
for example, Bosch and Maloney, 2008), it is explicitly incorporated into measurements of
unemployment in both country groups.
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SOAEs (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006; Boz, Durdu, and Li,
2015), and chosen based on data availability on unemployment at a quarterly
frequency. As noted earlier, we abstract from advanced economies that may
be large enough to influence our measure of global financial risk and focus
on SOAEs that may be more comparable to (small open) EMEs. All told,
the SOAE country sample includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden.
Our baseline EME country sample includes: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru,
Philippines, and Thailand.8 We note that excluding Netherlands and Thailand
from the SOAE and EME samples, respectively, allows us to extend the SOAE
time coverage back to 1999Q1 and the EME time coverage to 2003Q1. The
Appendix presents results excluding these two countries. Most importantly,
our main finding regarding unemployment remains unchanged.
Our approach builds on the well-known empirical work of Uribe and Yue
(2006). Our analysis is also closest to Akinci (2013), who extends Uribe and
Yue (2006) to analyze the role of global financial risk. We discuss key differ-
ences relative to their work further below.
Our estimation consists of two separate panel structural vector autoregres-
sions (SVAR), one for each country group (SOAE or EME):




where i denotes a given country, αi denotes country fixed-effects, and the
8Turkey and South Africa, which are commonly included in the EME group in the litera-
ture, represent clear outliers with respect to the level and cyclical volatility of unemployment.
We present results with these two countries in the EME sample in the Appendix (see Figure
A4). Also, while Israel is often included as an EME, it has levels of financial inclusion that
are similar to those of standard SOAEs.
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vector yi,t = [yi,t,invi,t, ui,t,, tbyi,t, Sg,t, Sc,t], where yi, invi, ui, tbyi, Sg, and Sc
denote real GDP, real investment, the unemployment rate, the trade-balance-
to-GDP ratio for country i, our measure of global financial risk, and a measure
of country-group (SOAE or EME) financial risk, respectively. The inclusion
of the trade balance allows us to control for spillover effects across countries
via trade flows. All variables are expressed in log deviations from a log-linear
trend, except for the trade balance-GDP ratio which is expressed in level devi-
ations from trend (see Uribe and Yue, 2006).9 We use Bank of America Merrill
Lynch’s U.S. high yield option-adjusted spreads as our measure of global fi-
nancial risk Sg, the Euro high yield index option-adjusted spread as a measure
that captures country-group financial risk or credit spreads for SOAEs (most
of which are in Europe and absent other country group measures that include
non-European small open advanced economies), and the high yield emerging
markets corporate plus sub-index option-adjusted spread as a measure that
captures country-group financial risk or credit spreads for EMEs (non-crucial
details regarding these measures are presented in the Appendix). The financial
risk series are obtained from FRED; country-level variables are obtained from
Haver Analytics. Our main results are based on the parsimonious specification
above (following related literature), but we show that our results—especially
with regards to unemployment—hold broadly under several alternative and
richer specifications in the Appendix.
Our choice of country-group credit spread measures for EMEs and SOAEs
is guided by several considerations. First, including country-group spread
measures that are comparable between the two country groups allows us to
9For the unemployment rate and the relevant spread measures, whose original series are
in rates, we use ui,t = log(1 + u
o
i,t), Sg,t = log(1 + S
o
g,t), and Sc,t = log(1 + S
o
c,t), where
variables with a superscript o stand for the original series expressed in rates. This has no
impact on our results.
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control for non-U.S.-related financial factors and more importantly for the im-
pact of U.S. financial risk on country-group financial risk. Second, given our
interest in differences between EMEs and SOAEs and not on EMEs alone, us-
ing country-group spreads that broadly capture financial conditions specific to
these two groups is the most straightforward approach in the absence of com-
parable country-specific credit spreads for both EMEs and SOAEs. Indeed,
most of the literature has focused on the response of EMEs to interest rate
shocks using EMBI-based country interest rates (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005;
Uribe and Yue, 2006; Ferna´ndez and Gulan, 2015). In fact, fully compara-
ble interest rate spread measures for SOAEs are not available since the latter
do not have EMBI measures. Thus, to maintain as much comparability as
possible and estimate the same specification for both country groups, we ab-
stract from including country interest rates (as in Uribe and Yue, 2006) in our
VAR specification and instead consider the above-mentioned country-group
risk measures.10
Identification Assumptions and Relation to Existing Work The iden-
tification assumptions we adopt follow well-known literature (see Uribe and
Yue, 2006, and Akinci, 2013). Specifically, we assume that A is lower tri-
angular with unit diagonal elements. In addition, given our focus on global
financial risk shocks, our baseline specification assumes that global (U.S.) and
country-group financial risk have lagged effects on real domestic variables, but
domestic variables can affect country-group financial risk contemporaneously
10We note, though, that the median correlation between the cyclical component of our
EME-country-group spread measure and the cyclical component of EMBI spreads for each
of the EMEs in our sample is 0.81 (with each country correlation being statistically signifi-
cant at conventional levels), suggesting that our EME country-group financial risk measure
successfully captures relevant features of country-specific interest rates. See Ferna´ndez and
Gulan, 2015, for the link between corporate and sovereign spreads.
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(see Uribe and Yue, 2006).
Figure 1: Orthogonalized Impulse Response Functions to an Increase in Global
Financial Risk (100 basis points): GDP, Investment, Unemployment, and
Country-Group Financial Risk
Notes: Authors’ calculations using data from Haver Analytics and FRED. The EME coun-
try sample includes: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, The Philippines, and Thailand. The
advanced-economy country sample includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden. Shaded areas represent 95
percent confidence intervals computed using Monte-Carlo simulations with 10000 replica-
tions.
This procedure allows us to extract global financial risk shocks and ana-
lyze their impact on economic activity and unemployment in our two country
groups. We follow related literature and order the global risk and country-
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group financial risk measures last, but this specific ordering does not affect
our main findings. A similar comment applies to a different ordering of all
variables within the domestic block. We estimate each panel SVAR with 1 lag
(using additional lags does not change our main conclusions).
There are two important and non-negligible differences between our work
and Uribe and Yue (2006) and Akinci (2013). Relative to these two studies: (1)
we compare SOAEs to EMEs instead of only studying EMEs; and (2) we focus
on global financial risk shocks as opposed to country and U.S. interest rate
shocks, which is similar to Akinci 2013), but include the unemployment rate
as a key domestic variable of interest within a context of EMEs and SOAEs
(this variable is absent in both Uribe and Yue, 2006, and Akinci, 2013, as well
as other related papers in the literature).11
Main Findings Figure 1 shows orthogonalized impulse response functions
of real GDP, investment, unemployment, and country-group financial risk in
EMEs and SOAEs to an increase in global financial risk of 100 basis points.
A temporary rise in global financial risk generates an increase in country-
group risk and unemployment and a contraction in output and investment
in both country groups. The overall response of output and investment is
very similar in EMEs and SOAEs, though EMEs seem to exhibit marginally
earlier recoveries, if at all. Importantly for our purposes, though, the rise in
unemployment is unambiguously more subdued and less persistent in EMEs.
11Akinci (2013)’s measure of global financial risk is the U.S. BAA corporate spread, which
is constructed as the U.S. BAA corporate borrowing rate minus the long-term U.S. Treasury
bond rate. Our measure of global financial risk is very similar as it coincides very well with
the U.S. BAA corporate spreads, even though our measure is based on high yield measures
with BB1 category or lower. Another difference relative to Akinci (2013) beyond including
unemployment is that our baseline EME sample includes more countries (Colombia, Philip-
pines, and Thailand) in addition to the set of countries in her EME sample. Using Akinci’s
measure of global risk does not change any of our main findings.
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We also note that EME financial risk is more responsive to the rise in global
financial risk relative to SOAE financial risk. This is not only consistent with
the well-known relevance of EMBI spread disturbances in the EME literature
(which capture EME financial risk) but also with Akinci’s (2013) findings
regarding the impact of global financial risk on country (EMBI) spreads in
an EME-only context. This result also makes the markedly more subdued
response of unemployment in EMEs all the more noteworthy.
The Appendix shows that using richer specifications do not change our
main findings. These specifications include: (1) adding private consumption
(Figure A1); (2) adding domestic credit to the private sector (subject to data
availability for EMEs, which implies a considerably smaller EME sample; Fig-
ures A2 and A3); (3) a richer specification with US real GDP and U.S. real
interest rates, as well as a commodity price index to control for global de-
mand conditions (Figures A7 and A8); and (4) an alternative specification
with the VIX volatility index as a proxy of global financial risk (Figure A9)
(see the Appendix for more details). A similar claim applies to the inclu-
sion of unemployment-based EME outliers (South Africa and Turkey) in the
EME sample, a longer time period for each country group (which implies ex-
cluding The Netherlands and Thailand from the SOAE and EME samples,
respectively), and an analysis restricted to having only small-open European
economies in the SOAE sample (see Figures A5 and A6 in the Appendix).
All told, we conclude that our main results—the most important and robust
of which is the unambiguously more subdued and less persistent response of
unemployment in EMEs—hold under a battery of different specifications.
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3 The Model
To shed light on the factors that may explain the differential response of unem-
ployment (and economic activity) to global financial shocks in EMEs relative
to SOAEs, we introduce banking frictions in the spirit of Gertler, Kiyotaki,
and Queralto (2012) and Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016) into a tractable
small-open-economy (SOE) RBC model with labor search. Banks use exter-
nal funds—specifically, domestic deposits and foreign funds—and their own
net worth to lend resources to production firms that participate in the bank-
ing system for the purchase of production capital. A standard assumption in
this literature is that banks are able to divert a fraction of external funds for
their own gain. As a result, they face frictions in obtaining external resources
for lending.
We make the following three non-trivial model additions to explore the
relevance of limited financial access by firms and households in EMEs amid
global financial risk shocks. First, we introduce two categories of households:
financially-included households, denoted by i, whose members have access to
bank deposits and account for a measure 0 < φn < 1 of individuals in the
economy; and financially-excluded households, denoted by e, whose members
do not have access to bank deposits (and therefore the banking system) and
who account for a measure (1− φn) of individuals in the economy. Second, we
define two categories of production firms. The first set of firms—in category (or
sector) i (for financially-included firms)—depend on bank credit to purchase
capital (and therefore participate in the banking system) and are owned by i
households. The second set of firms—in category (or sector) e (for financially-
excluded firms)—have no access to bank financing, are owned by e households,
and rely solely on internal (household) resources. Third, both firm categories
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face standard labor search and matching frictions, which generate equilibrium
unemployment. Following related literature, we abstract from endogenous
labor force participation decisions and normalize the total labor force (and
therefore the total population) to 1.
As noted in Section 2, EMEs have relatively low shares of the population
receiving wages into an account at a financial institution (recall Table 1), high
shares of self-employment (who operate micro firms), large shares of household-
owned and -operated micro and small firms without access to the banking
system, and a large share of informal (or unregistered) firms in EMEs that
rarely have access to or participate in formal credit markets (see IFC, 2010a,b;
GFDR, 2014). Assuming that e households are the owners and managers of
firms without bank credit is therefore consistent with the employment and
firm structure in EMEs suggested by the data, and does not change our main
conclusions.
Given the above non-trivial modifications to a standard SOE RBC model
with banking frictions, we initially assume that i (e) firms only hire workers
from i (e) households in order to highlight the central features of our baseline
framework with clarity. However, we stress that this assumption is incon-
sequential for our main results. Indeed, the Appendix presents the details
of a much richer framework where unemployed members in each household
category can search for jobs across firm categories (and not just within their
own category) such that there is no labor market segmentation. Importantly,
we show that our main findings and mechanisms remain intact in this richer
environment.
Final Output A perfectly-competitive final goods firm purchases sectoral
output from firms i and e to produce a final good whose price is normalized
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to 1. Formally, the firm maximizes Πa,t = [yt − pi,tyi,t − pe,tye,t] subject to the
CES function yt=y(yi,t, ye,t), where yi and ye denote firm i and firm e output,
respectively. In turn, pi and pe are the relative prices of sectoral output. The
solution to this problem yields standard optimal relative prices pi and pe that
depend on sectoral output shares.
Firm i-Capital Producers A representative capital producer is owned by
i households and sells capital to i firms.12 The capital producer chooses invest-




t|0Πk,t subject to Πk,t = [Qtii,t − ii,t − Φ (ii,t/ii,t−1) ii,t]
where the evolution of capital is ki,t+1 = (1 − δ)ki,t + ii,t.
13 Ξit|0 is the capital
producers’ discount factor (formally defined in household i’s problem below),
Qt is the price for firm-i capital, and δ is the exogenous depreciation rate.
Φ (ii,t/ii,t−1) is a standard investment adjustment cost function that satisfies

































Financially-Included Households A representative financially-included
(i) household has a measure 0 < φn < 1 of household members. Following
the labor search literature, there is perfect consumption insurance within the
household. i households are the ultimate owner of banks, i-capital produc-
ers, and i firms; they hold bank deposits and receive salaried income from
12Following the literature on banking frictions, the inclusion of capital producers merely
allows us to determine the equilibrium price of firm capital, which is relevant for banks’ net
worth since this price is a component of the total value of loans.
13We assume that capital producers choose next period’s investment to be consistent with
the VAR evidence, where investment does not respond contemporaneously to global financial
shocks. Assuming standard timing assumptions are inconsequential for our main results.
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household members employed in i firms. These households choose ci,t and
bank deposits dt to maximize E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ci,t) subject to ci,t + dt + Tt =
Rtdt−1 + Πa,t + Πi,t + Πb,t + wi,tni,t + bui,t, where u
′(ci) > 0,u
′′(ci) < 0. R
is the gross real interest rate on bank deposits; Πa, Πi and Πb are lump-
sum profits from final-goods-firms, i firms, and banks, respectively; T denotes
lump-sum taxes; wi is the real wage in firm i (determined via Nash bargain-
ing); b is the contemporaneous value of unemployment; ni,t is the measure of
workers employed by i firms; and ui,t = φn − ni,t is unemployment among i
households.14 The first-order conditions yield a standard consumption-savings
Euler equation: u′(ci,t) = RtEβu
′(ci,t+1). Household i’s stochastic discount
factor is Ξit+1|t ≡ βu
′(ci,t+1)/u
′(ci,t).
Firm i Production To introduce interest rate spreads and give financial
risk shocks a non-trivial role, we follow the literature on banking frictions and
assume that representative firm i requires external financing from banks to
purchase capital. Specifically, firm i raises external funds by selling state-
contingent securities si,t to banks at price Qt. This takes place in frictionless
markets (financial frictions giving rise to spreads are on the banks’ side). The
firm’s problem is to choose vacancies vi,t, desired firm-i employment ni,t+1,





Πi,t = pi,tztF (ni,t, k i,t)− wi,tni,t − ζ(vi,t)
−Qtki,t+1 +Qt(1− δ)ki,t +Qtsi,t − Rki,tQt−1si,t−1,
14Since there is no endogenous labor force participation, households simply take the per-
ceived evolution of employment in i firms, ni,t+1 = (1− ρ
i) [ni,t + ui,tfi,t], where fi,t is the
(endogenous) job-finding probability and ρi is the (exogenous) job destruction probability
in firm i, as given.
19
and the perceived evolution of employment ni,t+1 = (1 − ρ
i) [ni,t + vi,tqi,t] ,
where z is exogenous aggregate productivity, F (ni, k i) is a constant-returns-
to-scale production function that is increasing in both of its arguments, and
ζ(vi,t) is the total cost of posting vacancies, with ζ
′(vi,t) > 0 and ζ
′′
(vi,t) ≥ 0.
Rki is the return on firm-i capital; ρ
i is the exogenous employment separation
probability; and qi,t is the endogenous job-filling probability (discussed below).












as well as a capital Euler equation and an optimal choice over issued securities,
where the latter two can be combined to yield
Rki,t+1 =
[pi,t+1zt+1Fki,t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1]
Qt
. (3)
Intuitively, firm i equates the expected marginal cost of posting a vacancy to
the expected marginal benefit. The latter is given by the marginal product
of labor net of the Nash wage, plus the continuation value of the employment
relationship. In turn, the firm equates the marginal cost of issuing a security
to obtain bank funds to the return on capital, where the latter is given by the
marginal product of capital and the market value of a (depreciated) unit of
capital, adjusted for the initial price of capital Qt. Note that Qtsi,t = Qtki,t+1
holds in equilibrium.
Banks The banking structure follows a flexible-price, perfectly-competitive
version of Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016).15 A key difference in our
15As such, we follow their exposition and notation. See Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto
(2012) for a closed-economy version with inside and outside bank equity, as well as Gertler
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framework relative to existing models is the assumption that only a segment
of households and firms in the economy, as opposed to all of them, participate
in the banking system by supplying deposits and borrowing from banks. In
what follows, we abstract from using subscripts to denote individual banks
purely for expositional clarity.
Banks use their own net worth nwt and external funds—deposits from i
households dt and foreign funds b
∗
t—to lend to i firms via the purchase of
state-contingent securities si,t. The total loan value is given by Qtsi,t. Thus,
a given bank’s balance sheet is Qtsi,t = nwt + b
∗
t + dt, where nw depends
on the gross return from i-firm securities net of the costs of obtaining for-











, R∗ is the gross real foreign in-
terest rate and ηb [exp(b
∗
t − b
∗)− 1] is the debt-elastic component (Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003). As in Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016), let
xt be the share of total bank assets that are funded using foreign funds,
xt = b
∗
t/Qtsi,t. We can then rewrite the evolution of a bank’s net worth
as nwt = [(Rki,t − Rt) + xt−1 (Rt −R
∗
t )]Qt−1st−1+Rtnwt−1. Following the lit-
erature on banking frictions, banks can divert a fraction Θ(xt) of assets Qtsi,t






t has mean κ
∗ > 0
and follows a stochastic process. Since shocks to κ∗ embody foreign financial
disturbances affecting the domestic economy, with a rise in κ∗t causing the
bank’s constraint to become tighter, we interpret an exogenous increase in κ∗t
as an increase in global financial risk. Given the possibility of asset diversion
by banks, depositors restrict the amount of funds they supply to banks, and
the latter face constraints in obtaining external funds. Thus, banks accumu-
late assets via retained earnings and use their net worth, deposits, and foreign
and Kiyotaki (2010).
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funds to lend to i firms. A standard assumption to prevent banks from grow-
ing out of their constraints is to have banks exit the sector with exogenous
i.i.d. probability (1 − φ) each period, in which case i households receive the
exiting banks’ accumulated retained earnings. Exiting banks are immediately
replaced by entering banks so that the share of banks in the economy remains
constant (see Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto, 2012).






, where φ is the bank’s exogenous i.i.d. prob-
ability of survival. The bank will not divert external funds if the following
condition holds: Vt ≥ Θ(xt)Qtsi,t, where Θ(xt)Qtsi,t denotes the bank’s payoff
from diverting funds. All told, the bank’s Bellman equation at the end of
period t− 1 can be expressed as:








subject to the incentive compatibility constraint Vt ≥ Θ(xt)Qtsi,t and the evo-
lution of net worth nwt = [(Rki,t − Rt) + xt−1 (Rt −R
∗
t )]Qt−1si,t−1+Rtnwt−1.
Following the literature, we conjecture that Vt is linear in each of its compo-
nents. Thus, similar to standard models, we have
Vt(si,t, xt, nwt) = (ηi,t + xtη
∗
t )Qtsi,t + ηtnwt,













and ηi,t = EtΞ
i
t+1|tΩt+1 [Rki,t+1 −Rt+1] . Define the shadow value of the bank’s








, and let τt =
Qtsi,t/nwt be the bank’s leverage ratio (Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto, 2012).
In turn, ηi,t and η
∗
t denote, respectively, the discounted excess return on i-firm
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assets over deposits and the discounted difference between the rate of return
on deposits and foreign funds (a measure of the cost advantage of foreign funds
over deposits). Using the above conjecture for Vt(si,t, xt, nwt), the bank’s op-














This expression is identical to those in models with banking frictions and
determines the optimal share of foreign funds in total external funds for lending
(see Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki, 2016). Note that if η∗ increases relative to
ηi, it is cheaper in relative terms to use foreign funds, leading to a higher x.
Finally, given that banks exit with probability φ, the banking sector’s ag-
gregate net worth evolution can be expressed as:









where i households transfer an exogenous fraction ξ/(1 − φ) of the exiting
banks’ assets to entering banks to cover the startup costs of entering banks.
Adverse global (foreign) financial risk shocks—a higher κ∗t–tighten banks’
constraints and reduce the relative cost of using deposits as opposed to foreign
funds to finance loans. Both foreign funds and households’ deposits contract
since the amount banks can divert increases, leading to an equilibrium con-
traction in the demand for firm-i shares and therefore the provision of bank
loans. i firms’ ability to purchase capital falls, leading to reduced hiring that
is reflected in lower firm employment and ultimately output.
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Financially-Excluded Households and Firm e Production There is
a representative financially-excluded (e) household with measure (1− φn) of
household members and perfect risk pooling within the household. There is
also a representative e firm. Household e members can only work in e firms.16
Households own and receive income from e firms and make all decisions over
labor demand and capital accumulation for these firms. Thus, we can think
of e firms as family firms and interpret e households as supplying labor to e
firms other than the ones they own, and as hiring workers for their e firms
from e households other than their own. e firms use labor from e house-
holds and internally accumulated capital to produce.17 Given our assump-
tion about households effectively making all decisions for e firms, we frame
these households’ employment and capital decisions from the perspective of
a demander of labor. Formally, households choose consumption ce,t, capital





18 ce,t = Πe,t + we,tne,t + bue,t, e-firm
profits Πe,t = pe,tztF (ne,t, k e,t)− ie,t −we,tne,t − ζ(ve,t), the evolution of e-firm
capital ke,t+1 = (1 − δ)ke,t + ie,t, and the perceived evolution of employment
ne,t+1 = (1− ρ
e) [ne,t + ve,tqe,t] , where F (ne, k e) is a constant-returns-to-scale
16Recall that, as stated earlier, we relax this assumption and show that a richer version
of our baseline model where both households can send their unemployed members to search
across firm categories (presented in the Appendix) does not change our main conclusions.
17This is consistent with EME SMEs’ reliance on internal resources in the absence of
formal external financing (IFC, 2010a,b). Assuming a representative capital producer that
sells capital to both i and e firms (without the need for bank loans on the part of e firms
since, per the evidence in Section 2, the latter do not participate in the banking system)
does not change our main results. Of note, SMEs without access to bank financing tend to
be constrained. A reduced-form way of capturing this fact without introducing additional
financial frictions that would make the model even more complex is to allow e firms to face
larger investment adjustment costs relative to i firms. Doing so does not change our main
conclusions.
18Once again, we assume that investment is a state variable to guarantee that the response
of investment is consistent with the VAR evidence, but this assumption has no impact on
our main results.
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production function that is increasing in both of its arguments, ie is firm-e in-
vestment, we is the real wage in firm e (determined via Nash bargaining), and
ζ(ve,t) is the total cost of posting vacancies, with ζ




Of note, we abstract from explicitly including investment adjustment costs
above for expositional simplicity but include them as part of our quantitative
analysis to be consistent with i firms. ue,t = (1−φn)−ne,t denotes unemploy-
ment among e households, ρe is the exogenous firm-e employment separation
probability, and qe,t is the corresponding endogenous job-filling probability
(defined below).


















t+2|t {pe,t+2zt+2Fke,t+2 + (1− δ)} , (7)
where Ξet+1|t ≡ βu
′(ce,t+1)/u
′(ce,t) is the e household’s stochastic discount fac-
tor. Intuitively, firm e equates the expected marginal cost of posting a vacancy
to the expected marginal benefit, given by the (discounted) marginal product
of labor net of the wage, plus the continuation value of employment relation-
ships. Similarly, the firm equates the marginal cost of a unit of capital to its
expected marginal benefit.
Total Unemployment, Matching Processes, Nash Bargaining, and
Resource Constraint Let the matching functions mj,t = mj(vj,,uj,t) for
19Assuming that the cost of vacancy posting is convex captures in a reduced-form the
additional costs and constraints (including those that are outside the scope of this paper)
that prevent firms without access to bank credit from easily expanding.
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j = e, i be constant-returns-to-scale (CRS). The corresponding job-finding
(job-filling) probabilities are fj,t = f(θj,t) = mj,t/uj,t (qj,t = q(θj,t) = mj,t/vj,t),
while sectoral labor market tightness is θj,t ≡ vj,t/uj,t for j = e, i. Wages
are determined by bilateral Nash bargaining between households and firms, so
that wj,t = χ
[
pj,tztFnj (nj,t, k j,t) + ζ
′(vj,t)θj,t
]
+ (1− χ)b, for j = e, i, where χ
is the workers’ bargaining power.20
In turn, the government budget constraint is Tt = b(ue,t + ui,t) and the
economy’s resource constraint is given by21







We note that total unemployment is given by ut = ue,t + ui,t = 1− ne,t − ni,t.
The list of equilibrium conditions is presented in the Appendix.
4 Quantitative Analysis
Given the limited amplification present in standard models with banking fric-
tions (including ours), our quantitative analysis is meant to shed light on the
key economic factors that may explain the differential response to global fi-
nancial shocks in EMEs vis-a`-vis SOAEs rather than to exactly match the
quantitative responses across country groups in Section 2.
Functional Forms and Shocks The utility function is CRRA: u(c) =





j,t with 0 < αj < 1. In turn, the matching functions are of the CES form:
20See the Appendix for more details behind the value functions used to obtain the Nash
wage expressions.
21Once again, we introduce investment adjustment costs for e firms in our quantitative
analysis.
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1/µ with µ > 0 for j = e, i (see Den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson, 2000).22 The investment adjustment cost function is
Φ(ij,t/ij,t−1) = (ϕk/2)(ij,t/ij,t−1 − 1)
2, ϕk > 0 and the cost of vacancy posting
is ζ(vj,t) = ψ(vj,t)










, where 0 < γy < 1, φy < 1. We note γy is one
way in which we can tractably capture the relative importance of firms that
participate in the banking system in economic activity without introducing
endogenous firm entry, where the latter would add unnecessary complexity to
an already rich environment.23








t , where 0 < ρκ < 1 and ε
κ
t ˜N(0, σκ). Finally,
aggregate productivity z is normalized to 1. Given our main focus on financial
risk shocks, we assume that aggregate productivity is constant.
Parameters from Literature We calibrate our benchmark model to a rep-
resentative EME. Values for standard parameters are based on existing liter-
ature on business cycles, labor search, and banking frictions. The time period
is a quarter. The capital shares αi and αe are set to 0.32 (plausible and
factual differences across firm categories, with e firms being less capital inten-
sive, do not change our results). The household’s subjective discount factor is
β = 0.985 and the capital depreciation rate δ is 0.025. The workers’ bargain-
ing power χ is set to 0.50, a standard value in the literature. The share of i
household members in the economy is φn = 0.45, consistent with the EME ev-
idence in Table 1. The exogenous separation probabilities are set to ρi = ρe =
22As noted in Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), such functional form implies that
all matching probabilities are bounded between 0 and 1 always.
23See Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro (2017) for work on banking reforms in a model
with monopolistic banking, search frictions, and endogenous firm entry in an EME context.
27
0.04, in line with evidence for EMEs (Bosch and Maloney, 2008; asymmetries
do not change our main conclusions). We assume that φi = φs = 2 (see Merz
and Yashiv, 2007). In addition, φy = 0.8, implying a relatively high degree of
substitution between firm i and firm e output in total output (our results do
not change under other reasonable values).24 The steady-state foreign interest
rate R∗ is set to 1.0019 (Ferna´ndez and Gulan, 2015).
The relative risk aversion parameter σ is 2. The majority of EMEs do not
have official unemployment insurance (UI) schemes, so the contemporaneous
value of unemployment b is 0. We show that deviations from this assumption
for SOAEs where official UI schemes are the norm do not change our con-
clusions. We set the foreign debt elasticity parameter ηb to 0.001, a smaller
number consistent with the EME business cycle literature (Garc´ıa-Cicco, Pan-
crazi, and Uribe, 2010). We set ϕk = 1, consistent with commonly-used values
in the literature (Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto, 2012). Alternative values
for these parameters do not change our main findings. Finally, given our focus
on global financial risk shocks, we set ρκ = 0.90 and σκ = 0.01,. The persis-
tence parameter is consistent with the empirical evolution of a global financial
risk shock.
Calibrated Parameters for Benchmark (EME) Model The remaining
parameters µ, ψ, γy, φ, κ
∗, ξ, and λ are chosen to match: an unemployment rate
of 6.41 percent, a total cost of posting vacancies as a share of output of roughly
2 percent (broadly consistent with the search literature; alternative plausible
24The relatively high substitutability between firms’ output is consistent with survey
evidence suggesting that more than 70 percent of registered (or formal) firms—firms that are
more likely to participate in the banking system—in our EME sample report facing direct
competition from unregistered firms (which are less likely to participate in the banking
system) (World Bank World Development Indicators). This high degree of competition
naturally implies that output across firm categories is likely to be highly substitutable on
average.
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targets have no impact on our main findings), a share of firm i output in to-
tal output of 0.63, a bank leverage of 6 and a ratio of foreign-currency bank
liabilities to total bank liabilities of roughly 0.25 (IMF Financial Soundness
Indicators), a ratio of bank startup funds to net worth of 2.78 percent (Global
Financial Development Database), and a median quarterly lending-deposit
spread of 1.16 percent (World Bank World Development Indicators). These
targets are based on averages for the EME sample in our empirical analysis.
As a baseline and in the absence of direct measurements on the contribution of
firms that have bank credit to total output, we use the share of formal-sector
output (which is more often than not comprised of firms that participate in
the banking system) from Schneider (2012) as a proxy. Of course, while most
economies incorporate measurements of informal sector production in their
national accounts, the extent to which this is captured varies by country, es-
pecially among EMEs where the informality is more prevalent. We explore the
sensitivity of our results to this target. All told, the resulting parameter values
are: µ = 0.1350, ψ = 0.0165, γy = 0.6379, φ = 0.8832, κ
∗ = 4.9192, ξ = 0.0387,
and λ = 0.4576. Introducing plausible asymmetries across firm categories does
not change our main conclusions.
Parameters for SOAE Model To minimize any asymmetries that would
otherwise cloud the driving mechanisms, we use the same values for all pa-
rameters. As a baseline and per the evidence in Section 2, the only difference
between EMEs and SOAEs is in the share of i households φn, which we set to
0.977 based on Table 1. This difference alone endogenously generates a higher
share of total output from firms with bank credit (see Table 3).25
25This is consistent with the fact that the average size of the informal sector in SOAEs,
which we use as a proxy for output by firms that do not participate in the banking system
absent other measures, is considerably lower in these economies relative to our EME sample.
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4.1 Steady State
Table 3: Steady States in Benchmark (EME) Model and SOAE Model
Variable EME SOAE EME,
Higher γy
y 0.8196 0.9825 0.8407
ni 0.4227 0.9116 0.4234
ne 0.5132 0.0219 0.5096
u 0.0641‡ 0.0665 0.0670
Agg. Consumption 0.6625 0.8073 0.6870
Agg. Investment 0.1400 0.1530 0.1361
Lending Spread 0.0116‡ 0.0116 0.0116
d 1.9926 3.6693 2.6928
b∗ 0.6642 1.2214 0.8963
si 3.1882 5.8688 4.3069
piyi/y 0.6300
‡ 0.9677 0.8700‡
Average LP 0.8760 1.0530 0.9011
Notes: ‡ denotes a targeted first moment. Average LP denotes average labor productivity in
the economy. Aggregate consumption is given by the sum of e and i households’ consumption
when appropriate. Aggregate investment is given by the sum of sectoral investment. All
averages refer to employment-weighted averages.
Table 3 shows that, relative to SOAEs, EMEs have: lower output, con-
sumption, and investment levels; lower levels of domestic deposits and foreign
funds and incidentally lower bank credit (both in levels and as a share of total
(annual) output), a smaller contribution of firms with bank credit to total
output, and somewhat lower unemployment. Thus, our model endogenously
generates well-known differences in economic development (proxied by total
output y), banking sector importance in financing production, and domestic
financial access between EMEs and SOAEs.
A relevant implication of the model is that the share of employment (as
a percent of the labor force) in firms with bank credit is 0.42 in EMEs—this
is an endogenous outcome and not a result of the calibration targets we use.
The corresponding share in the SOAE model is 0.91. Intuitively, increasing
φn to SOAE levels implies that a larger share of individuals in the economy
supply bank deposits. In turn, this leads to higher domestic credit (a higher
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si), which allows i firms to obtain more capital and increase hiring, inducing
an endogenous reallocation of employment away from e firms and into i firms.
As a result, ni is now much higher. Coupled with the increase in i-firm capital,
i-firm output is not only higher (which contributes to a higher total output
level) but also accounts for a larger share of total output (second-to-last line
in Table 3). Of note, this reallocation of sectoral output is also endogenous.
More important is the endogenous reallocation of employment across firms
emphasized above since a larger ni implies that the bulk of employment is
now in i firms, which are directly vulnerable to changes in global financial risk.
In principle and given how sectoral unemployment is determined, a potential
outcome in the model could be that the change in φn is simply reflected in an
increase in sectoral and aggregate unemployment, with little change in sectoral
employment. This is not the case in our model: sectoral employment does
change, as confirmed in Table 3. Finally, the model generates an average
labor productivity in SOAEs that is higher relative to EMEs (consistent with
cross-country OECD data).
While data limitations prevent us from pinning down the share of em-
ployment in firms with bank credit (labor market surveys do not ask whether
individuals are employed in firms that have bank credit), indirect evidence sug-
gests that the relative allocation of employment in the EME and SOAE models
is plausible. Indeed, more than 70 percent of firms in EMEs tend to be unregis-
tered (informal) and have hardly any access to bank credit; also, most of these
firms tend to be small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which account for more
than 50 percent of employment in EMEs (IFC, 2010a; Ayyagari, Demirguc-
Kunt, Maksimovic, 2011; OECD, 2013). In fact, informal employment—
defined as employment without a formal or legally-protected contract and
without pension benefits, the bulk of which is in SMEs—represents close to
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50 percent of the labor force in our EME sample but only 13 percent in our
SOAE sample (OECD, 2009; European Social Survey). Therefore, taking in-
formal employment as a rough indicator of employment in firms without bank
credit, the (endogenous) allocations of employment in the benchmark (EME)
model and in the SOAE model are broadly in line with the data.26 This is im-
portant to highlight since the (endogenous) share of employment across firms
determines the share of employment that is vulnerable to financial disruptions.
4.2 Response to Global Financial Risk: Data vs. Model
We compare the responses of the benchmark (EME) model and the SOAE
model to a temporary and identical increase in global financial risk (an increase
in κ∗t ).
Figure 2 shows that our framework can successfully generate the broad dif-
ferential response of unemployment, but also output and investment, in EMEs
and SOAEs. Particularly noteworthy is the unambiguously more subdued re-
sponse of unemployment in the EME model.27 Of note, the fact that the
scales of the model-generated impulse responses do not match their empirical
counterparts in absolute terms is not a damning limitation since our main ob-
jective is to shed light on the underlying causes behind the existence of relative
differences in the response of EMEs vis-a´-vis SOAEs. Also, while the model-
generated impulse responses are less hump-shaped and lack amplification, the
26In our sample of EMEs and SOAEs, the correlation between the share of individuals
with an account at financial institutions and the size of the informal sector as a share of
GDP (informal employment as measured by the share of non-agricultural self-employment)
is -0.81 (-0.84) and strongly statistically significant.
27As shown in Figures A11 and A12 in the Appendix, recalibrating the SOAE to match
SOAE-specific targets and assuming positive unemployment benefits in the SOAE model
alongside changes in the degree of financial inclusion consistent with SOAEs’ levels of finan-
cial inclusion delivers a more (empirically-factual) hump-shaped unemployment response
without changing any of our conclusions.
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latter is well-known in models with banking frictions and lies beyond the scope
of study.
Figure 2: Response of Output and Unemployment to a Rise in Global Financial
Risk: Model vs. Data
Notes on ”Data” column: Based on authors’ calculations using data from Haver Analyt-
ics and FRED. The EME country sample includes: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, The
Philippines, and Thailand. The advanced-economy country sample includes: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Swe-
den. Shaded areas represent 90 percent confidence intervals computed using Monte-Carlo
simulations with 1000 replications.
The intuition behind the contraction in economic activity and expansion
in unemployment in both economies is straightforward: a temporary increase
in κ∗ tightens banks’ constraints, implying that the amount of external funds
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they can divert increases. This pushes households to reduce deposits. At
the same time, the fall in the supply of deposits leads to an increase in the
discounted difference between the rate of return on deposits and foreign funds,
which pushes banks to reduce their demand for foreign funding.
All told, banks’ overall external funds contract, leading to a reduction in
the availability of bank resources for i firms. The resulting fall in funding not
only affects i firms’ prospects of obtaining funds for capital but also leads to
an increase in lending-deposit spreads that ultimately puts a dent on capital
demand and hiring. As a result, i-firm investment, employment, and output
fall. Given i firms’ larger contribution to output and their more sensitive
employment response, total output falls and unemployment rises. Of note,
this occurs despite the fact that a segment of the economy is less dependent
on the banking system and therefore less exposed to financial disruptions.
Household Financial Inclusion and Unemployment Dynamics As
shown in Figure 2, household financial inclusion is crucial for explaining the
more subdued expansion of unemployment in EMEs in the data.
In turn, the fact that an increase in household financial inclusion endoge-
nously generates a larger share of total output coming from firms with bank
credit contributes to differences in investment and output dynamics between
EMEs and SOAEs.28 To shed light on the intuition behind our dynamic re-
sults, Figure 3 compares the benchmark (EME) model (red dashed line) and
the SOAE model (solid blue line) after an identical exogenous temporary in-
crease in global financial risk in the two economies.
28EMEs tend to have larger average lending-deposit spreads relative to SOAEs. These
would be reflected in differences in λ, but this is not a feature tied to financial inclusion
and participation per se, but rather to other structural features of the banking system.
We discuss the implications of differences in bank lending-deposit spreads as part of our
robustness analysis.
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Figure 3: Response to a Rise in Global Financial Risk: Higher Household
Financial Inclusion in EMEs
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Absent any other differences between EMEs and SOAEs, the response
of bank-related variables (deposits, foreign funds, and domestic credit and
spreads) is the same in both economies.29 Importantly, note that while e va-
29Introducing steady-state productivity differentials such that i firms are more productive
in SOAEs relative to EMEs implies that domestic credit and foreign funds exhibit sharper
contractions in EMEs, without changing our main results. This is consistent with empirical
evidence based on a richer VAR specification that includes domestic credit to the private
sector (subject to data availability for EMEs; see Figures A2 and A3 in the Appendix).
Differences in lending-deposit spreads between SOAEs and EMEs also generate a differential
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cancies fall by less in EMEs, i vacancies exhibit similar contractions in the
two economies. Furthermore, recall from Table 3 that more than 50 percent
of employment is in e firms in EMEs, whereas the bulk of employment is in
i firms in SOAEs. Taken together, this implies that in SOAEs, the response
of i employment will be the primary driver of the response of unemployment.
Thus, the sharper fall of i-firm employment in SOAEs contributes to the larger
increase in total unemployment. While not shown for expositional brevity, we
note that wages contract by more in the SOAE model, suggesting that the
sharper response of unemployment is not a result of more stable wages.
Output and Investment Turning to the response of output and invest-
ment, the more subdued response in EMEs traces back to the fact that e firms
contribute more to total output and investment relative to SOAEs. As a result,
the smaller response of investment and output among e firms in EMEs (not
shown) has greater weight in total investment and output, leading to earlier
recoveries in both. Of course, this result is based on a baseline assumption of
perfect measurement of output by firms without bank credit (Figure A14 in
the Appendix illustrates a version of the model with imperfect measurement
of output and investment showing that, as expected, the latter are closer to
SOAEs under imperfect measurement in EMEs).30
To make our point regarding the importance of household financial inclu-
sion for unemployment dynamics more transparent, consider a version of the
baseline (EME) model where we fix the share of i households at its baseline
level and instead consider the contribution to total output by firms with bank
response in bank-related variables.
30Recall that per ILO guidelines, labor market surveys explicitly consider formal and
informal employment, especially in EMEs. As such, unemployment is much less likely to be
mismeasured in terms of not capturing those who are likely to have found employment in
firms without bank credit.
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credit as the only difference between EMEs and SOAEs. Specifically, we choose
γy to match a share of output from these firms in total output of 0.87 (a target
consistent with our proxy for the i-firm output share in SOAEs; see Schneider,
2012) while holding all other parameters at their baseline (EME) values. The
last column of Table 3 shows the steady state for this scenario. Note that the
model is once again able to generate several stylized facts on the differences
between EMEs and SOAEs, mainly higher output and domestic credit levels,
among others. Importantly, though, the allocation of employment across firm
categories remains virtually unchanged relative to the baseline (EME) model.
Figure A10 in the Appendix shows that when we increase change γy to generate
a larger share of i-firm output in total output relative to the baseline (EME)
model, the importance of i-firm output in total output, by itself, has no impact
on unemployment dynamics. This confirms that the endogenous reallocation
of employment induced by higher household financial inclusion is crucial for
explaining the differences in unemployment dynamics in EMEs and SOAEs,
but must be accompanied by a corresponding change in the contribution of
firms with bank credit to total output in order to generate a response of output
and investment in the two country groups that is more subdued and consistent
with the empirical evidence in our parsimonious empirical specification.
All told, the endogenous allocation of employment across firms with and
without bank credit, which can be traced back to the share of financially-
included individuals in the economy, plays a critical role in generating non-
trivial differences in unemployment dynamics in EMEs—economies where less
than 50 percent of individuals have access to bank deposits—relative to SOAEs—
economies where virtually all individuals participate in the banking system.
More broadly, the cyclical dynamics of investment, unemployment, and output
are consistent with the empirical response of EMEs and SOAEs to an increase
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in global financial risk. Moreover, our model-based results regarding the share
of individuals with access to the banking system, the share of employment in
firms with bank credit, and the share of output by these firms are broadly con-
sistent with the empirical relationship between informal employment, informal
sector size, and financial inclusion (see Section A.16 of the Appendix, Figure
A15, and the accompanying discussion; as noted there, informal employment
(as measured by self-employment) and informal sector size are proxies for em-
ployment and economic activity in firms that are excluded from participating
in the banking system absent comparable cross-country data on employment
and output in firms without bank credit).
The Irrelevance of Labor Market Segmentation for Differential Un-
employment Dynamics For simplicity, our benchmark model assumes that
individuals searching for employment in i (e) firms belong to i (e) households
and cannot search for employment in e (i) firms (i.e., labor market segmenta-
tion). In a non-trivial modification of the model, we now allow both households
to endogenously choose how to allocate their unemployed members to search
across both firm categories. Incidentally, i and e firms can now hire work-
ers from both household categories. This establishes an additional non-trivial
channel beyond relative prices through which global financial risk shocks af-
fects e firms and households. For expositional brevity, the details of this richer
framework and its calibration are presented in the Appendix.
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Figure 4: Response to a Rise in Global Financial Risk: Household Employment
Search Across Firm Categories


















































































































Advanced Economy Emerging Economy AE with UI Benefits
Note: Whenever the blue lines are not visible, the SOAE model and the SOAE model with
UI benefits are responding in exactly the same way, so that the blue and green lines are
superimposed.
Figure 4 presents the results for the richer model and confirms that our
baseline assumptions regarding labor search are not critical for explaining the
differential response of unemployment—our most important and robust em-
pirical finding—and that our results are not obtained by construction. As was
the case in the baseline model, differential unemployment dynamics are ex-
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plained by household financial inclusion, with the unemployment response in
SOAEs being driven by the response of i searchers (i.e., unemployed individ-
uals from both households searching for employment in i firms). We also show
that having unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in SOAEs b—calibrated
to represent 60 percent of average wages based on OECD evidence—further
strengthens this mechanism.
Alternative Explanations and Robustness Two differences between EME
and SOAEs beyond financial inclusion are the presence (absence) of UI benefits
in SOAEs (EMEs), which are initially zero in both economies to minimize any
unnecessary asymmetries, and differences in domestic lending-deposit spreads.
One possible explanation behind the unemployment response in SOAEs is
that real wages are less volatile relative to EMEs (as in the data; see Boz,
Durdu, and Li, 2015). A simple way to check that this is not a quantitatively-
plausible explanation is to consider UI benefits in SOAEs as the only differ-
ence between country groups—with SOAEs (EMEs) having positive (zero) UI
benefits—which makes real wages in SOAEs less volatile. As shown in Fig-
ure A13 in the Appendix, differences in UI benefits alone (holding financial
inclusion at its baseline level) cannot generate considerable differences in un-
employment dynamics between the two economies amid global financial risk
shocks. Figure A11 in the Appendix also shows that assuming differences in
unemployment benefits across country groups alongside differences in house-
hold financial inclusion (that is, a SOAE model with UI benefits) does not
change our conclusions. Thus, neither rigid wages nor positive UI benefits
alone can rationalize the differential unemployment response across country
groups.
While EMEs have an average quarterly lending-deposit spread of 1.16 per-
40
cent, SOAEs have an average spread of 0.811 percent. Figure A12 in the
Appendix shows a version of the baseline (EME) model where we reduce λ
to match the lending-deposit spread in SOAEs, holding all other parameters
(including φn) at their baseline (EME) values.
31 The Appendix shows that
lending-deposit spreads by themselves play a minor role in explaining the dif-
ferential response of unemployment between country groups.
Finally, our work focuses on global financial shocks and not on uncondi-
tional business cycle dynamics. We note that the benchmark (EME) model is
able to generate factual business cycle dynamics in EMEs—a relative con-
sumption volatility greater than 1, and countercyclical trade balance and
unemployment—when aggregate productivity shocks and country premia shocks
that are negatively correlated with productivity (see, for example, Neumeyer
and Perri, 2005) are incorporated into the model. In turn, the SOAE model
generates a relative consumption volatility lower than 1, an acyclical or pro-
cyclical trade balance, and countercyclical unemployment when country pre-
mia shocks are factually smaller.
5 Conclusion
Emerging economies (EMEs) exhibit considerably lower levels of domestic
household and firm financial participation relative small open advanced economies
(SOAEs). We provide novel VAR-based evidence suggesting that after an in-
crease in global financial risk, the response of unemployment is markedly more
subdued in EMEs relative to SOAEs. In contrast, the differential response of
31Of note, in this recalibrated version of the model, λ is lower relative to our baseline
EME. This implies that a smaller fraction of resources are diverted by banks and is, in
a reduced-form way, consistent with SOAEs having more developed banking systems and
stronger institutions relative to EMEs.
41
GDP and investment across the two country groups is noticeably smaller. We
build a small open economy model with labor search, banking frictions, and
household and firm heterogeneity in participation in the banking system to
shed light on this fact. In the model, adverse global financial shocks disrupt
banks’ ability to raise external funds, reducing the availability of resources for
firms that rely on bank credit, thereby leading to a contraction in aggregate
employment, investment, and output. We show that the share of financially-
included individuals in the economy is critical for explaining the differences
in unemployment dynamics across country groups. Thus, limited access to
bank credit by firms is not sufficient for explaining the differential response of
unemployment in the two country groups: the degree of household financial
inclusion is important as well. Our findings may have implications for the
effectiveness of cyclical policies responding to financial shocks in economies
with limited domestic financial participation among firms and households.
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